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Abstract
In this study, we investigate changes in banks' capital adequacy ratio (CAR) under different stress scenarios and examine the results by
comparing conventional banks to participation banks in Turkey. Our results report that the capital adequacy ratio of the banks declines sub-
stantially given the stress scenarios. We find that participation banks in Turkey suffer more in declined capital adequacy ratio compared to
conventional banks. Our findings reveal that participation banks in Turkey are more sensitive to sudden changes in exchange rates and increased
non-performing loans. However, this sensitivity is in regards to capital adequacy, not profit. Overall, our study shows the effect of stress in the
banking sector by contributing to the existing literature.
Copyright © 2016, Borsa _Istanbul Anonim S¸irketi. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Pillar 1 risks are a major component of the banking sector
crucial to measuring the capital adequacy ratio and deter-
mining a bank's performance under stress. In this study, we
specifically focus on Turkish conventional and participation
banks in terms of Pillar 1 risks to understand the expected
movements of the capital adequacy ratio after analyzing
different types of risks such as credit risk, market risk, and
operational risk. Pillar 1 risks are important due to the fact that
they set out the rules by which regulatory capital can be
determined. For this reason, Pillar 1 risks can be used as an
indicator to understand certain risks banks will take.
This study shows that participation banks are more sensi-
tive to shocks followed by economic turmoil such as a) a drop
in house prices (real estate market), b) an increase in bad loans
(non-performing loans) as a result of customers' bankruptcy in
terms of capital adequacy ratio and its components (capital,
credit risk, market and operational risk), and c) an increase in
currency rates, as Turkey applies the floating exchange system
and is open to all kinds of large fund movements due to po-
litical stability, interest rates, and investment opportunities. As
a result, we are motivated to investigate whether or not the
participation banks in Turkey (Islamic banks) are more sen-
sitive to those risks than conventional banks.
The reason participation banks are more sensitive can be
explained by credit risk exposures, as observed throughout the
study. We conclude that participation banks are more exposed
to credit risk scenarios such as currency and NPL increases
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and collateral value decreases. However, this sensitivity in-
volves only the capital adequacy, not the profitability or
liquidity, as the main focus of this study is the capital ade-
quacy standards of banks. Overall, our study shows the effect
of stress in the banking sector by contributing to the existing
literature.
Pillar 1 is derived from Basel II, which are recommendations
and suggestions on banking laws and regulations issued by the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervisions. Therefore in this
study we will analyze the Pillar 1 risks in Turkish conventional
and participation banks, considering Basel II rules, to evaluate
the capital adequacy ratio in both interest-rate sensitive and
interest-rate free banking systems under stress.
Basel II was implemented in June 2006, when the com-
mittee uploaded the new framework for capital measurement
and capital standards. As a result, financial institutions
changed the way they calculate and measure capital. For this
reason, we will evaluate different approaches such as the Basic
Indicator Approach and Standardized Approach to understand
the Pillar 1 risks, benefitting from moving from one approach
to the other while controlling for capital.
Since the banking system has become more sophisticated
recently, with rapid changes resulting from technology and
deregulation, it has been a dilemma to find the right balance
between supervision, regulation, and market discipline. Since
Turkey is an emerging market, banks and other financial in-
stitutions in the country react differently compared to the
emerged markets of innovations and transformations.
Hence, in this paper we will study Basel II along with Pillar
1 risks to evaluate the major changes that are taking place in
financial markets and to understand the allocation of the
capital ratio of given participation banks once exposed to
stress, with particular reference to the need for increased
sensitivity to all types of risks. Since Basel II was planned to
strengthen capital adequacy, we will implement stress tests in
a framework designed to understand how the Pillar 1 risks can
affect the banking system and determine the performance of
participation banks in Turkey compared to conventional banks.
Participation banks have been in Turkey since the early
1980s (Investment Support and Promotion Agency of Turkey,
2015). According to the Banking Regulation and Supervision
Agency of Turkey (BDDK), assets of participation banks in
Turkey reached 45 billion USD, which is 5.5% of the whole
banking sector's assets, while deposits of participation banks
are around 28 billion USD, or 6.3% of all deposits including
conventional banks (Mustafa Dereci, 2014).
Similar to assets and deposits, loans issued by participation
banks reached about 29 billion USD by 2014, which is 6% of
all loans, and saving deposits of participation banks is 19
billion USD, which is 7.8% of all saving deposits (BDDK,
2014). Participation banks in Turkey have also been growing
their SME loans, gold deposits, number of ATMs, and number
of branches over the last 30 years (Turkish Central Bank,
2013). For the purpose of this study, we will compare partic-
ipation banks in Turkey with conventional banks and try to
understand the stress test results under Pillar 1 risk and
examine their performance.
In Turkey, conventional and participation banks can collect
deposits and utilize them through extension of credits, both
corporate and retail. Both types of banking are regulated by
the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA)
under a single Banking Law and associated regulations. The
BRSA regulates and supervises all aspects of banking. The
Central Bank is also involved with regards only to foreign
currency operations and reserve requirements.
Participation banks are functionally similar to deposit
banks, but their collecting and lending methods of funds are
different. There is no separate regulation regarding participa-
tion banking. The law, however, distinguishes between deposit
and participation banking. Regulations governing fund
collection and fund utilization are different between these two
types of banks. There are also minor differences in accounting
methods. The law, taking into consideration the nature of the
profit and loss participation accounts, also allows for a slightly
different calculation method for the capital adequacy ratio for
participation banks. The account structure of participation
banks is as follows:
Current accounts (demand accounts) are described as
drawn partially or completely at any call, earnings unpaid with
liability covering principal. Profit/loss participation accounts
are defined as profit/loss accrued at maturity shared pro rata,
with no profit ratio fixed in advance and no guarantee of any
revenue or repayment of principal amount after tenor.
The main products of participation banks can be summa-
rized as follows: Corporate finance support includes financing
the purchase of goods and services required by the customer.
Costs of the goods and services are paid to the seller, the
customer becomes indebted to the bank, and payment docu-
ments must be kept by the branch.
Individual finance support includes financing the purchase
of the vehicles, houses, and consumer goods required by
consumers. The costs of the goods to be purchased are paid to
the seller and the customer becomes indebted to the bank.
Leasing movable/immovable goods are purchased by
participation banks and the purchased goods are hired to the
customer and transferred to the Lessee after the payments.
Profit and loss partnership investment refers to financing
both the labor and the amount invested where profit/loss shares
are mutual. After completion of the investment or projects,
profit or loss is shared by partners.
As a result of the unique working principles of participation
banks, i.e. all credit facilities (loans) must be used for real
solid projects, funds are paid directly to the vendor (supplier of
commodity) after the purchase of equipment against invoices.
This prevents credits from being used in risky and speculative
areas that run contrary to their intended purpose.
The policy of lending loans in installments and recovering
the loans by monthly installments has been generally effective
in regulating the cash flow and liquidity needs of participation
banks and strengthening the loans' security. Lending against
invoices places an obstacle to irrational behavior by preventing
enterprises from using credits to incur unnecessary debts.
On the other hand, the crediting method in participation
banks' pattern called “leasing” provides enterprises credited
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compatible with their cash flow and financing is made
compatible with crediting techniques. In other words, this
method allows investments to be financed by long-term
financing. Because participation banks have based their pro-
cesses on invoices and formal documents as per their princi-
ples, they have been helping the government in its struggle
against the informal economy.
2. Literature review
The previous literature has examined the Pillar I risks and
Basel II regulations in various dimensions. Chami, Sharma,
and Khan (2003) suggested that Basel II is necessary for the
surveillance and supervision of banks where regulations are
created to answer fast-changing financial environments.
Gurtler, Hibbeln, Vohringer (2007) studied the measurement
of concentration risk in credit portfolios which is necessary for
regulatory capital and showed the importance of assured Basel
II rules. Our study contributes to the literature by examining
Pillar I risks and focusing on identifying, evaluating, assess-
ing, and reporting the main risks and measurement methods
and applying scenario analysis and stress tests to the banking
sector of Turkey.
Ojo (2010) concentrated on both Basel I and Basel II rules
and found that under Basel I the capital of the banks increased
during economic downturns and decreased during economic
booms and the increased risk sensitivity of Basel II increased
the sensitivity of capital charges. He found that Basel II had an
effect on lending. Additionally, he mentioned that Basel II can
help financial institutions, such as banks, manage high levels
of credit through their funds from loans to bonds. Building on
that, we shed light on how Pillar I risks are important and may
affect the banking sector in Turkey during stress scenarios of
economic downturns.
Hakenes and Schnabel (2006) studied bank size and risk-
taking under Basel II. Under Pillar 1 of the New Basel Cap-
ital Accord, they found that small banks (and small borrowers)
may actually profit from the introduction of an internal ratings
based approach if the approach is performed uniformly across
the banks. However, the study also showed that banks which
cannot distinguish between the standardized approach and the
internal ratings based approach can suffer and be pushed to-
wards higher risk-taking competition which may lead to
higher aggregate risk in the economy. This is consistent with
Kashyap and Stein (2004) who pointed out the potentially
adverse macroeconomic effects of Basel II with the endoge-
neity of financial risks. Similar to previous findings, Rime
(2003) and Repullo and Suarez (2004) analyzed Pilar 1 risks
and found that banks under different risks should choose ap-
proaches carefully because they can result in higher compe-
tition, leaving them with either high risk or low risk consumer
loan types.
Roy (2005) observed that Basel II is an important concept;
banks have better information and can therefore effectively
control Pillar I risks, such as credit risks, operational risks, and
market risks. Each of these risks has different approaches to
measure it. Thus, the basic indicator approach, internal
measurement approach, and value at risk approach have been
used to test Pillar I risks where banks can adjust themselves
once they are exposed to given risk levels. Based on this, we
also test Pillar I risks and confirm that participation banks and
conventional banks in Turkey adjust themselves once they are
exposed to risk scenarios. However, the result and response
from adjustment is different for each bank type.
Gilbert (2006) confirmed that Basel II regulations have a
different adoption process in different nations. He found that
the U.S., Europe, and Hong Kong have a regulatory divergence
from the objectives of Basel II for implementation, since
different countries apply different capital ratios for risk
sensitivity requirements. Additionally, Pelizzon and Schaefer
(2005) found that banks should comply with Pillar I re-
quirements to reduce the likelihood of exposing capitalization
costs. Equally important, Santos (2000) mentioned that Pillar I
risks encourage banks to develop sufficient capital re-
quirements and adjust their risk profiles for measuring,
determining, and analyzing the risks. Subsequently, Naceur
and Kandil (2008) examined the MENA region based on the
Basel accord. Their study provided support for a significant
increase in credit growth after applying capital regulation
implementations. Although a higher capital adequacy ratio
was measured, the study concluded that banks increased their
credit and assets growth. Moreover, Jacques and Nigro (1997)
studied the Basel approach on risk in the selected banks'
portfolio. After using a sample of U.S. banks, the authors
concluded that capital regulations have a significant effect on
the proportion of risky assets in banks' balance sheets where
the higher capital requirements may result in an increase of
portfolio risk.
However, Montgomery (2005) discussed the concept of
capital adequacy ratio, assumed under the Basel Accord in
Japanese banks. The study indicated that banks modified their
portfolios into less risky assets rather than heavily weighted
risky assets. The study concluded that the regulatory capital
ratio has no effect on both international and domestic asset
portfolios. Likewise, Agenor and Silva (2009) built a
connection between the risk weights of regulations and the risk
premium of banks under Basel II. The authors found that the
necessary amount of capital that banks must hold is deter-
mined in two ways, namely the institutional nature of bor-
rowers and the riskiness of each particular borrower.
Therefore, capital adequacy requirements affect bank lending
rates, which in turn determine investment and output. In the
same manner, our study contributes to the literature by
investigating the effect of Pillar I risks on the capital adequacy
ratio and showing that participation banks and conventional
banks in Turkey respond differently to stress scenarios. The
change in the capital adequacy ratio for both types of banks
differs in terms of the risk they are exposed to.
Taher (2012) analyzed risk and capital adequacy ratio based
on Islamic finance in UAE. His study suggested that although
the Basel approach may not be designed for Islamic in-
stitutions, the Islamic Finance Board announced that risk
management and capital adequacy would be implemented in
accordance with Islamic Shari'a. Hassan and Mazumder
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(2001) illustrated the key points of Islamic finance and found
that interest-free banking in OIC countries is more effective in
terms of stable and smooth velocity of money, controllability
of monetary aggregates (MNI and MI), and stronger linkage
between monetary policy instruments and ultimate policy
goals of the economy. Given this, our study introduces a new
approach where we compare participation (Islamic) and con-
ventional banks in Turkey and test the capital adequacy ratio
changes under Pillar I risks by investigating whether partici-
pation (Islamic) banks' response to shock is different than that
of conventional banks since participation banks have a
different operational approach.
Equally significant, Mariani and Hassan (2012) analyzed
the efficiency of a sample of Islamic and conventional banks in
Malaysia for the period of 2000e2008 and demonstrated that
full-fledged Islamic banks have higher input requirements. In
addition, their results indicated that conventional banks that
have Islamic bank subsidiaries have relatively higher effi-
ciency. In contrast, their study also found that both foreign
full-fledged Islamic banks and conventional banks with Is-
lamic bank subsidiaries exhibited a negative productivity
change, which they attributed to a negative rate of technical
change and scale change effects. This is a similar finding to
our study where we show that participation (Islamic) banks in
Turkey are more sensitive to shocks because their asset
structure, operations, and risk exposure are different from
conventional banks.
Subsequently, Hassan, Hussain, Kayed (2011) analyzed
Basel I regulations on Islamic banking with 67 unique banks
from 2002 to 2008 and found that regulations actually forced
undercapitalized Islamic banks to increase their capital.
Although the authors showed that Islamic banks adjusted
themselves to the higher capital requirement, increased risk
had no effect on the banks' asset portfolio.
Following this further, Hassan and Dicle (2005) considered
the impact of Basel II regulations on Islamic banking. Their
findings showed that although the concept of Basel II does not
include Islamic banks, the new model of credit risk rating can
actually be implemented in Islamic banking. Since it provides
financial stability and risk control, the authors suggested that
Basel II should be implemented by Islamic finance, as the
regulations could help Islamic banks compete globally. Hassan
and Chowdhury (2010) studied the relationship between Basel
II regulations and Islamic finance. They mentioned that since
Islamic banks must operate under regulatory regimes, Islamic
banking is more difficult and complex compared to conven-
tional banks as it includes a set of ethical and religious stan-
dards. The authors favored Basel II regulations and
commented that the regulations would help increase growth
opportunities for Islamic banks. Further, Smolo and Hassan
(2010) recommended that Basel II should be applied by the
Islamic banking sector where the regulations could develop an
appropriate capital adequacy ratio that would increase the
credibility and soundness of the Islamic financial system
worldwide. For this purpose, Hassan and Dicle (2007) sug-
gested that Basel II regulations could provide better corporate
governance for Islamic banking and address major problems in
the sector. Motivated by that, we also investigate the capital
adequacy ratio changes in both participation (Islamic) and
conventional banks in Turkey to understand the effects of
regulations and how they respond to shocks under given
circumstances.
3. Methodology
To test stress on Pillar I risks and identify the expected
changes in the capital adequacy ratio, we start by under-
standing each risk and its basic assumptions. Pillar I risks are
identified as credit risk, market risk, and operational risk.
Therefore, we run three different scenarios on three types of
Pillar I risks and try to analyze the consequences of each
scenario.
Credit risk is the possibility of loss that the bank may
become exposed to due to the failure of a credit customer to
fulfill the obligations of the enacted contract and the failure to
execute these obligations, partially or fully, in the required
time frame. Credit Risk Weighted Assets indicates the amount
of assets banks should reserve to prevent damage if exposed to
credit risk.
3.1. Increase in non-performing loans
This scenario is the first component of credit risk where the
risk amounts of banks are associated with “non-performing
loans.” NPL can increase dramatically as a result of market
fluctuations. To demonstrate our stress scenario, we include
the recalculated total credit risk amount to the capital ade-
quacy ratio calculation and measure the shock effect of an
increase in NPL accounts on capital. While the gross NPL
amount of the related month-end figure is increased 80%, the
“Special Provision” amount set aside for those loans is
assumed to be the same. The reason for leaving provision
amounts unchanged due to the scenario is that the capital
adequacy ratio is calculated by using net NPL amounts ac-
cording to Basel II principles. The provision amount is left
unchanged in order to create a larger impact on capital in the
NPL amount increase scenario, and the effect of an increase in
NPL accounts on the capital adequacy ratio is measured.
3.2. Increase in exchange rates
The scenario of an increase in exchange rates is the second
part of credit risk and is applied to risk weighted assets. To
determine the amount of foreign currency in the credit risk
weighted assets, we first check the part of the balance sheets
that lists the ratio of foreign currency divided by assets. As a
result, we find that between 30% and 40% of credit risk
weighted assets are in foreign currency rather than domestic
currency (FX indexed loans are considered to be in foreign
currency as balance sheet items). Since the purpose of this
study is to distinguish the results of participation banks and
conventional banks under stress, we calculate two ratios for
the two types of banks. To apply our scenario, we increase the
USD currency rate from 2.20 to 2.50 for the assumption that
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the balances of all the FX loans in the banks' portfolios are
affected by a possible increase in exchange rate.
3.3. Changes in collaterals
The last component of credit risk is changes in collaterals.
For the collateral scenario, we determine the mortgage loans
and consider the expected decreases in the true value of the
properties in a given financial crisis. According to the Basel II
rules in Turkey, credits with real estates defined as collaterals
contain 50% risk weights. An unexpected decrease of 20% in
the true value of properties increases the risk weight bucket by
75%. We calculate the changes in collaterals for both partic-
ipation banks and conventional banks. Based on the assump-
tion that all appraisal values of the real estate mortgage
collaterals of loan portfolios will be devalued by 20% as a
result of a crisis scenario, the impact on the capital adequacy
ratio is measured.
After applying three scenarios for the three components of
credit risk, we continue evaluating the second part of the Pillar
I risks, which is defined as market risk.
Market Risk is the probable loss that the bank may be
exposed to as a result of its positions/portfolios on/off the
balance sheet as a result of changes in interest rates, exchange
rates, and securities prices. Market Risk Weighted Assets in-
dicates the amount of assets banks reserve to prevent damage
if exposed to market risk.
3.4. Market risk
Stress testing of market risk in the banking sector is con-
ducted by the method of estimating maximum losses by
applying a reverse shock to the net general FX position on the
basis of the FX rate increase scenario and adding the sum of
the losses to the market risk weighted asset amount. Thus, it
measures how FX rate shocks, in parallel with the FX increase
scenario, will affect the banks' CAR.
The last component of the Pillar I risk is operational risk.
Operational risk is the possibility of loss created by inad-
equate or unsuccessful internal processes, persons, or systems,
or external factors including legal risk. Operational Risk
Weighted Assets indicates the amount of assets banks reserve
to prevent damage if exposed to operational risk.
3.5. Operational risk
Banks in Turkey are currently applying the ‘Basic Indicator
Approach’ as per the Basel II guidelines regarding operational
risk measurement. In this approach, an operational risk
weighted asset is calculated as a function of gross income and
the formulation is stated below:
KBIA ¼
hX
ðGI1…n x bÞ
i
=n
KBIA: The capital amount to be kept in accordance with
Basic Indicator Approach;
GI: Annual gross income* of the last three years (if
positive);
b: Rate of 15% which is determined by the Basel Com-
mittee as per the ratio of sectoral required capital level to the
sectoral indicator level; and.
n: The number of years in which the gross income is pos-
itive in the last three years.
* Gross income ¼ Net Operating Income þ Net Non-
Operating Income.
In order to apply stress to operational risk, the effect of
possible damage to physical assets is measured. In the stressed
case, operational risk loss is assumed to be 1% of the regu-
latory capital and this amount is added to the current opera-
tional risk weighted asset in order to create a negative impact
on the capital adequacy ratio.
On the other hand, since operational risk is a function of
gross income in the “Basic Indicator Approach,” when the
stress testing shock scenario is applied to operational risk in
the same way, the amount of risk declines, which creates a
positive impact on the capital adequacy ratio.
Therefore, the common approach followed in stress testing
will not generate meaningful results in terms of operational
risk. Hence, as an alternative approach of exposing operational
risk to stress, the amount of damage to be incurred in physical
assets is added to the legal capital reserved for operational risk
in order to measure the impact of such damage on the capital
adequacy ratio.
To summarize, we apply our scenario below to test the
Pillar I risk under stress;
a) Credit Risk:
FX Rate Increase: 1 USD ¼ 2.50 TRY (currency was 2.20
as of October 14)
NPL Ratio Increase: 80%
Collateral Deterioration: 20% (Real Estate appraisal value
devaluation)
b) Market Risk:
FX Rate Increase: 1 USD ¼ 2.50 TRY (applied to Struc-
tural FX open position)
c) Operational Risk:
Operational risk loss: 1% of the capital.
4. Data
The data is collected from BDDK, the Banking Regulation
and Supervision Agency of Turkey. BDDK is a public open
database that contains all banks types of Turkey including
conventional, participation, and investment. We use monthly
data from January 2006 to October 2014 to calculate NPL
(non-performing loans). Our sample contains 106 monthly
observations.
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Moreover, we use daily exchange rates from January 2014
until the end of October 2014. The foreign exchange rate is the
ratio of the Turkish Lira to the U.S. dollar. Since we use daily
data, we end up having 238 observations. We use Turkish
Central Bank data in addition to BDDK banking information
for consistency.
5. Empirical results
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the Turkish
banking sector. Panel A shows the main differences between
conventional and participation banks in terms of banking
characteristics. Since the conventional banks in Turkey have a
longer history, their numbers outperform the participation
banks for all criteria. However, the number of participation
banks in Turkey has been growing and its portion of the
banking sector is expected to increase. Panel B exhibits the
non-performing loans with their current ratio as of October
2014. A non-performing loan is a loan that is in default or
close to being in default. In Turkey, loans become non-
performing after being in default for 90 days according to
the Banking Law. In October 2009, the NPL ratio of the
Turkish banking sector reached 5.42% as a result of economic
crisis. “NPL Fluctuation” indicates the increase in NPL from
the Current Ratio to Maximum Ratio by 80% (5.42/3.00).
Panel C demonstrates the volatility of Daily Exchange Rates in
USD with standard deviation and the maximum value of USD.
Table 1a contains the summary values for collaterals and
risk weighted assets in conventional banks as of October 2014.
The numbers are in millions. Credit risk is the possibility of
loss that the bank may become exposed to due to the failure of
a credit customer to fulfill the obligations of the enacted
contract, partially or fully, in the required time frame. “Credit
Risk Weighted Assets” indicates the amount of assets banks
reserve to prevent damage if exposed to credit risk. The main
difference between credit risk and credit risk weighted asset is
the collateral amount, or in other words, security coverage and
risk degree of the customers. “Stressed Credit Risk Weighted
Assets” indicates the credit risk weighted assets after applying
the stress test. The total shows the total amount of credit risk
weighted assets after stress scenario. The numbers are in
millions. Risk weighted assets are multiplied by 80% as a
result of a decrease in the true value of property. Mortgage
loans with real estate collateral are defined by a 50% risk
Table 1
Summary statistics.
October 2014 Conventional Participation
Panel A
Number of banks 44 4
Number of domestic branches 11.115 1.046
Number of abroad branches 84 4
Number of ATMs 40.953 2.025
Number of staff (Domestic) 197.627 16.675
Number of staff (Abroad) 786 70
Regulatory capital amount 251.289 11.247
Credit risk weighted asset amount 1.371.391 67,009
Market risk weighted asset amount 38,204 1628
Operational risk weighted asset amount 116,654 7009
Panel B
2006e2014 monthly time series Non performing
loans ratio
Current ratio 3.00%
Maximum ratio (2009 October) 5.42%
NPL fluctuation (%) 80%
Panel C
2014 daily time series USD currency
Standard deviation 5.95%
Maximum value (28 January 2014) 2.34
Calculated shock (St. Dev * Max.Value) 2.5
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the banking characteristics in Turkey.
Panel A exhibits the main differences between Conventional and Participation
banks in terms of banking characteristics. Data is collected from the Turkish
Central Bank as of October 2014. Panel B shows the Non Performing Loans in
the banking sector. NPL Fluctuation indicates the increase in NPL from
Current Ratio to Maximum Ratio by 80%. Panel C demonstrates the volatility
in Daily Exchange Rates in USD with Std. Deviation and the maximum value
of USD reached.
Table 1a
Change in collaterals and current credit risk weighted assets by October 2014.
Panel A. Conventional
banking sector
Credit risk Credit risk
weighted
assets
Stressed
credit risk
weighted
assets
Assets with 0% of risk weight 481,367.94 e
Assets with 10% of risk weight e e
Assets with 20% of risk weight 75,428.10 15,085.62
Assets with 50% of risk weight 164,781.02 82,390.51
Assets with 50% of risk weight
(With mortgage as a collateral)
156,826.70 78,413.35
Assets with 75% of risk weight 321,946.25 241,459.69
Assets with 100% of risk weight 724,757.52 724,757.52
Assets with 150% of risk weight 29,377.97 44,066.96
Assets with 200% of risk weight 88,101,44 176,202.87
Assets with 250% of risk weight 3605.90 9014.75
Assets with 1250% of risk weight e e
Total 1,371,391.27
Panel B. real estate appraisal value deterioration
Assets with 0% of risk weight 481,367.94 e
Assets with 10% of risk weight e e
Assets with 20% of risk weight 75,428.10 15,085.62 15,085.62
Assets with 50% of risk weight 164,781.02 82,390.51 65,912.41
Assets with 50% of risk weight
(With mortgage as a collateral)
156,826.70 78,413.35 78,413.35
Assets with 75% of risk weight 321,946.25 241,459.69 266,176.84
Assets with 100% of risk weight 724,757.52 724,757.52 724,757.52
Assets with 150% of risk weight 29,377.97 44,066.96 44,066.96
Assets with 200% of risk weight 88,101,44 176,202.87 176,202.87
Assets with 250% of risk weight 3605.90 9014.75 9014.75
Assets with 1250% of risk weight e e e
Total 1,379,630.33
Table 1a is the summary values for Collaterals and Risk weighted assets in
Conventional banks as of October 2014. The numbers are in millions. Credit
risk is the possibility of loss that the bank may become exposed to due to the
failure of a credit customer to fulfill the obligations of the enacted contract,
partially or fully, in the required time frame. Credit Risk Weighted Assets
indicates the amount of assets banks reserve to prevent damage if exposed to
Credit Risk. Stressed Credit Risk Weighted Assets indicates Credit Risk
Weighted Assets after applying the stress test. Total shows the total amount of
credit risk weighted assets after the stress scenario. Numbers are in millions.
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weight. According to the Basel II rules, for example, a 20%
decrease in the value of real estate would leave 20% of
mortgages non-collateralized. Thus, this uncovered portion of
the credit risk weighted assets will be added to the 75% risk
weight bucket due to Basel II principles.
Table 1b contains the summary values for collaterals and
risk weighted assets in participation banks as of October 2014.
The numbers are in millions. Credit risk is the possibility of
loss that the bank may become exposed to due to the failure of
a credit customer to fulfill the obligations of the enacted
contract, partially or fully, in the required time frame. “Credit
Risk Weighted Assets” indicates the amount of assets banks
reserve to prevent damage if exposed to credit risk. The main
difference between credit risk and credit risk weighted asset is
the collateral amount, or in other words, security coverage and
risk degree of the customers. “Stressed Credit Risk Weighted
Assets” indicates the credit risk weighted asset after applying
the stress test. The total shows the total amount of credit risk
weighted assets after stress scenario. The numbers are in
millions. Risk weighted assets are multiplied by 80% as a
result of a decrease in the true value of property. Mortgage
loans with real estate collateral are defined by a 50% risk
weight. According to the Basel II rules, for example, a 20%
decrease in the value of real estate would leave 20% of
mortgages non-collateralized. Thus, this uncovered portion of
the credit risk weighted assets will be added to the 75% risk
weight bucket due to Basel II principles.
Table 2 shows the Increase in Non-Performing Loans,
defined as Net Non-Performing Loans in the Balance Sheets of
Banks collected from BDDK. NPL indicates the loans that are
in default or close to being in default after being delayed for
90 days or more. NPL is multiplied by 80% to simulate an
NPL increase scenario in case of an economic crisis. NPL is
calculated including both Turkish Currency and Foreign
Currency (FX) NPL amounts. The “After Stress” column ex-
hibits the amount of increase in NPL under the stress scenario.
80% of 32,561.38 is equal to 26.049,11 and the rest of the
figures are calculated with this principle. Currency shift is
reflected into the Foreign Currency NPL amounts as well as
the 80% increase. The total number, given in millions, is the
amount left after the 80% increase.
The column labeled “Before Stress” exhibits the amount of
NPL in both conventional and participation banks in the given
national currency and foreign currency. NPL indicates the
loans that are in default or close to being in default after being
delayed for 90 days or more. The column labeled “After
Stress” exhibits the amount of increase in NPL under the stress
scenario due to the stress caused by an increase of 80% given a
shock. The Total section indicates the amount of NPL by
combining both currencies after applying the converting rate.
Table 3 shows the second component of credit risk in Pillar
I as defined by an increase in exchange rates. To calculate the
foreign currency, we analyze the increase in USD in 2014
against the Turkish Lira. We start by studying the volatility of
daily USD and find that the highest value of 1 USD between
January 2014 and October 2014 was 2.34 TL (1
USD ¼ 2.34 TL). In the case of our stress scenario, we add the
standard deviation and assume that 1 USD will be equal to
2.50 TL in this scenario (1 USD ¼ 2.50 TL). The results are
shown in Table 3.
Table 3 exhibits the stress test of an increase in the USD
from 2.20 TL to 2.50 TL. Furthermore, we calculate our re-
sults based on including foreign currency indexed loans
(calculated FX). The loans are derived from the part of balance
sheets that lists the ratio of foreign currency items to total
assets. Including foreign exchange indexed loans shows that
36% of the risk weights are in foreign exchange for conven-
tional banks while 30% are in foreign exchange for partici-
pation banks. In this table, we assumed that the ratio of foreign
currency items to total assets reflects the proportion of foreign
currency credit risk weighted assets to total credit risk
weighted assets. So, “Calculated FX” shows the credit risk
weighted assets in foreign currency calculated by the Foreign
Currency/Total Assets ratio (1,406,238.25  36%). “Calcu-
lated TL” indicates credit risk weighted assets in Turkish Lira.
Table 1b
Change in collaterals and current credit risk weighted assets as of October
2014.
Panel A. Participation banks Credit risk Credit risk
weighted
assets
Stressed
credit risk
weighted
assets
Assets with 0% of risk weight 18,807.74
Assets with 10% of risk weight e
Assets with 20% of risk weight 5258.44 1051.69
Assets with 50% of risk weight 23,907.08 11,953.54
Assets with 50% of risk weight
(With mortgage as a collateral)
5248.85 2624.43
Assets with 75% of risk weight 15,281.30 11,460.98
Assets with 100% of risk weight 38,859.34 38,859.34
Assets with 150% of risk weight 291.24 436.86
Assets with 200% of risk weight 297.32 594.63
Assets with 250% of risk weight 11.12 27.80
Assets with 1250% of risk weight e
Total 67,009.27
Panel B. Real estate appraisal value deterioration
Assets with 0% of risk weight 18,807.74
Assets with 10% of risk weight e
Assets with 20% of risk weight 5258.44 1051.69 1051.69
Assets with 50% of risk weight 23,907.08 11,953.54 9562.83
Assets with 50% of risk weight
(With mortgage as a collateral)
5248.85 2624.43 2624.43
Assets with 75% of risk weight 15,281.30 11,460.98 15,047.04
Assets with 100% of risk weight 38,859.34 38,859.34 38,859.34
Assets with 150% of risk weight 291.24 436.86 436.86
Assets with 200% of risk weight 297.32 594.63 594.63
Assets with 250% of risk weight 11.12 27.80 27.80
Assets with 1250% of risk weight e
Total 68,204.61
Table 1a is the summary values for Collaterals and Risk weighted assets in
Conventional banks as of October 2014. The numbers are in millions. Credit
risk is the possibility of loss that the bank may become exposed to due to the
failure of a credit customer to fulfill the obligations of the enacted contract,
partially or fully, in the required time frame. Credit Risk Weighted Assets
indicates the amount of assets banks reserve to prevent damage if exposed to
Credit Risk. Stressed Credit Risk Weighted Assets indicates Credit Risk
Weighted Assets after applying the stress test. Total shows the total amount of
credit risk weighted assets after the stress scenario. Numbers are in millions.
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“After FX” exhibits the sum of foreign currency credit risk
weighted assets multiplied by the stressed USD currency dif-
ference and TL credit risk weighted assets.
In Table 3, Calculated TL has two components. First, we
determine the credit risk weighted assets where we use the
total amount of risk weighted assets after the 20% collateral
deterioration (Table 1). Then, we add the total non-performing
loans (Table 2). The difference is the Calculated TL (national
currency). Simply, Calculated TL refers to total credit risk
weighted assets in Turkish Lira.
The increase in foreign currency (USD) is from 2.20 TL to
2.50 TL, which is approximately a 13% increase. Multiplying
this ratio by the Calculated FX gives us the increase in foreign
currency. Finally, we add the Calculated TL to the Calculated
FX to find the total effect of an increase in exchange rates as a
credit risk component of Pillar I risks.
Until this point, we applied our scenarios of changes in
collaterals, increases in NPLs, and changes in exchange rates
to a subset of credit risk under Pillar I. In the next section, we
control for market risk as a component of Pillar I risks.
Similar to an increase in exchange rates, we calculate
market risk based on the given rise in exchange rates from
2.20 to 2.50 and analyze the open position of reverse shock to
net general FX position. First, we determine the net open
position of both conventional and participation banks in terms
of foreign exchange. Then, due to our scenario, we factor in
the exchange rate increase of 13% as a shock and report it in
the last column as “Additional Market Risk Weighted Assets”.
Table 4 exhibits the stress scenario for market risk. We
determine the net position of FX and calculate market risk
based on an increase in foreign exchange rates. “Net Open
Position of FX” is the difference between total open long
(receivable) and open short (payable) positions in a given asset
in terms of foreign currency. Market risk is the probable loss
that the bank may be exposed to as a result of its positions/
portfolios on/off the balance sheet due to changes in interest
Table 2
Increase in non-performing loans.
Before stress After Stress (Incremental)
Local currency Foreign currency Total Local currency Foreign currency Total
Conventional Non Performing Loans 32,561.38 614.69 33,176.07 26.049,11 558,81 26,607.92
Participation Non Performing Loans 3425.81 6.16 3431.97 2740.65 5.60 2746.25
Table 2 shows the Increase in Non-Performing Loans defined as Net Non-Performing Loans in the Balance Sheets of Banks collected from BDDK. NPL indicates
the loans that are in default or close to being in default after being delayed for 90 days or more. NPL is multiplied by 80% to simulate an NPL increase scenario in
case of economic crisis. NPL is calculated by including both Turkish Currency and Foreign Currency (FX) NPL amounts. The “After Stress” column exhibits the
amount of the increases in NPL under the stress scenario. The total is the amount left after the 80% increase and is given in millions.
Table 3
Increase in exchange rates.
Ratio of foreign currency items to total assets
Conventional Participation
Excluding foreign currency indexed loans 35% 27%
Including foreign currency indexed loans 36% 30%
FX increase in conventional banks
Credit risk weighted assets Calculated FX Calculated TL After FX (USD ¼ 2.50)
1,406,238.25 506,527.02 899,711.23 1,475,310.11
FX increase in participation banks
Credit risk weighted assets Calculated FX Calculated TL After FX (USD ¼ 2.50)
70,950.86 21,377.50 49,573.37 73,865.98
Table 3 shows the scenario of Increase in Exchange Rates from 2.20 USD to 2.50 USD to analyze the effect in Conventional Banks and Participation Banks. Credit
Risk Weighted Assets are calculated by adding the total amount of Risk Weighted Assets and the amount left after the 80% increase in NPL and 20% collateral
deterioration. Foreign Currency Indexed Loans are loans in Turkish lira whose interest rates are indexed to a foreign currency. Calculated FX shows the Credit risk
weighted assets in foreign currency calculated by the Foreign Currency/Total Assets ratio. Calculated TL indicates Credit risk weighted assets in Turkish Lira.
“After FX” exhibits the sum of foreign currency credit risk weighted assets multiplied by the stressed USD currency difference and TL credit risk weighted assets.
Numbers are in millions.
Table 4
Market risk effect.
Conventional Net Open
Position of FX
2933.16
Participation Net Open
Position of FX
149.40
USD currency Stressed FX Difference Additional market risk
weighted assets
2.20 2.50 13% 399.98 (conventional)
20.37 (participation)
Table 4 shows the Market Risk effect under stress based on Pillar I risks. We
determine the Net Position of FX and calculate Market Risk based on
increasing foreign exchange rates. Net Open Position of FX is the difference
between total open long (receivable) and open short (payable) positions in a
given asset in terms of foreign currency. Market Risk is the probable loss that
the bank may be exposed to as a result of its positions/portfolios on/off the
balance sheet due to changes in interest rates, exchange rates, and securities
prices. Market Risk Weighted Assets indicates the amount of assets banks
reserve to prevent damage if exposed to Market Risk. Additional Market Risk
Weighted Assets denotes the amount of loss that will be added to the original
market risk weighted assets as part of the scenario assumptions. Additional
Market Risk Weighted Assets are in millions.
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rates, exchange rates, and securities prices. Therefore, the
additional market risk weighted assets is the 13% increase in
exchange rate as a shock that we report in the last column
under “Additional Market Risk Weighted Assets” for both
conventional and participation banks.
Therefore, in Table 4, we assume that the market risks of
the banks are sensitive to their open FX positions since one of
the major components of market risk under Basel II regula-
tions is “currency risk”. So here we calculate the impact of a
currency shift to net open FX positions and assume that same
impact will hit the market risk weighted assets in parallel.
Generally, the BDDK does not publicly announce the market
risk components of banks so we can never know the real
impact of a stress to the market risk weighted assets of the
sector.
Table 5 shows the operational risk under Pillar I. To apply
stress to operational risk, the effect of probable damage to
physical assets is calculated. Under the stress scenario, oper-
ational risk loss is assumed to be 1% of the regulatory capital;
therefore that amount is added to the current operational risk
weighted asset to generate a negative impact on the capital
adequacy ratio.
The first column in Table 5 shows the equity of given banks in
October 2014. Equity refers to the total capital amount of the
bank and consists of paid-capital, retained earnings and cash,
and statutory reserves. Operational risk is the possibility of loss
created by inadequate or unsuccessful internal processes, per-
sons or systems, or external factors including legal risk. Oper-
ational risk weighted assets are calculated using the amount of
operational risk exposure collected from the capital adequacy
data of the BDDK. After applying a 1% shock, we calculate the
stressed loss and add that amount to the operational risk
weighted assets to see the total shock in the banking sector.
Based on the findings in Table 5, we assumed that a big
disaster like an earthquake, tsunami, or flood will hit banks'
head offices or major branches and cause damages which can
be calculated as a portion of the banks' capital amounts.
Despite the fact that all banks in Turkey currently measure
operational risk using the basic indicator approach, which is
based on income, we hereby simulate a real operational loss
scenario and add this loss to the actual operational risk
weighted asset amount.
In the last part of our study, we calculate the expected
decrease in the capital adequacy ratio. To determine the capital
adequacy ratio, we combine our losses under the Pillar I risks
derived from the stress shocks in the tables explained above.
Since the purpose of this study is to analyze expected de-
creases in the capital adequacy ratio, we report our findings in
Table 6.
Table 6 reports the expected decreases under all Pillar I
risks combined. “Regulatory Capital” refers to the amount of
equity to be considered in the capital adequacy ratio calcula-
tion as defined by the local regulator, which can be directly
obtained from BDDK web site. The credit, market, and
operational risk weighted assets (RWA) amounts stated in the
table are the main outputs of this study. Each risk weighted
asset calculation methodology is explained in the related
section of the paper. “CAR” (Capital Adequacy Ratio) sig-
nifies “Regulatory Capital” divided by the summation of
“Credit RWA”, “Market RWA”, and “Operational RWA”.
“Impact” is the change in CAR between current and stressed
scenarios and is calculated in percentages. Numbers are in
millions. In this table it can be easily seen that the capital
adequacy ratio of the participation banks is more sensitive
Table 5
Operational risk.
October 2014 Equity Operational-RWA Shock Stressed loss Operational risk weighted assets after shock
Conventional 251,289.00 116,653.91 0.01 2512.89 119,166.80
Participation 11,246.79 7009.19 0.01 112.47 7121.66
Table 5 shows the Operational Risk in Sector, Conventional, and Participation Banks based on a given shock to their capital and calculates the loss after the stress.
Equity refers to the total capital amount of the bank and consists of paid capital, retained earnings and cash and statutory reserves. Operational Risk is the
possibility of loss created by inadequate or unsuccessful internal processes, persons or systems, or external factors including legal risk. Operational Risk Weighted
Assets indicates the amount of assets banks reserve to prevent damage if exposed to Operational Risk. Shock is 1% of the total capital as per the stress scenario
assumptions. Numbers are in millions.
Table 6
Expected decrease in capital adequacy ratio.
Impact analysisa Conventional Participation
Credit RWA 7.6% 10.2%
Market RWA 1.0% 1.3%
Operational RWA 2.2% 1.6%
October 2014 Conventional Participation
Panel A
Current
Regulatory capital 251,289.00 11,246.79
Credit RWA 1,371,391.28 67,009.26
Market RWA 38,203.77 1628.36
Operational RWA 116,653.91 7009.19
CAR 16.46% 14.87%
Panel B.
Stressed
Regulatory capital 251,289.00 11,246.79
Credit RWA 1,475,310.11 73,865.98
Market RWA 38,603.75 1648.73
Operational RWA 119,166.80 7121.66
CAR 15.39% 13.61%
Impact 6.95% 9.24%
Table 6 reports the expected decreases under all Pillar I risks combined.
Regulatory Capital refers to the amount of equity to be considered in the
capital adequacy ratio calculation defined by the local regulator. CAR (Capital
Adequacy Ratio) indicates Regulatory Capital divided by the summation of
Credit RWA, Market RWA and Operational RWA. Impact is the change of
CAR between the current and stressed scenarios and is calculated in per-
centages. Numbers are in millions.
a Individual impact on risk weighted assets after applying each shock.
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(9.24% impact) to stress than the capital adequacy ratio of
conventional banks (6.95% impact).
6. Conclusion
In this study, we investigate the effect of stress tests on the
Turkish banking sector by determining the Pillar I risks for
participation banks and comparing them to the sector as a
whole. Since the main purpose of this study is to calculate the
expected decreases in the capital adequacy ratio after exposure
to Pillar I risks under the stress scenarios, we examine each of
the Pillar I risks as well as their components; credit risks,
market risks, and operational risks. Furthermore, we conduct
our stress tests for the given risks and report our results. To
finalize, we combine the amount left after exposing risk as a
loss and then calculate the decrease in the capital adequacy
ratio. Since the decrease in CAR in participation banks is
higher, we can summarize that participation banks in Turkey
are more sensitive to stress compared to conventional banks.
However, this sensitivity is in regards to capital adequacy, not
profit. The reason participation banks are more sensitive can
be explained by the credit risk exposures observed throughout
the study. We conclude that participation banks are more
exposed to credit risk scenarios such as currency and NPL
increases and collateral value decreases. Overall, our study
shows the effect of stress in the banking sector by contributing
to the existing literature.
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